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RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: EXPLAINING THE CONTROVERSY, 
 AND SMALL STEPS TOWARDS A MORE NUANCED POLICY 
 
MATTHEW BENNETT, AMELIA FLETCHER,  
EMANUELE GIOVANNETTI & DAVID STALLIBRASS1
 
INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Over recent years, there have been important divergences of 
thinking between (some) economists and (some) lawyers about the 
appropriate treatment of Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) under 
competition law.2 In the US, these divergences were brought into 
focus by the Leegin case, in which the Supreme Court concluded 
that RPM should no longer be viewed as per se illegal under US 
antitrust law.3 In the EU, the debate has been precipitated by 
                                                 
1 All the authors are economists at the UK Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT). However, the views expressed in this paper are their own and 
not necessarily those of the OFT. Emanuele Giovannetti is also 
Associate Professor, Department of Economic Sciences, University of 
Verona. 
2 This paper uses the term RPM to encompass both fixed price RPM or 
minimum RPM, and both are covered by the arguments made throughout. It 
is not intended that the paper covers maximum RPM, which is typically 
viewed as unlikely to be anticompetitive.   
3 Leegin Creative Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, Supreme Court of the 
United States, 28 June 2007. 
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the Commission’s review of its vertical restraints block 
exemption and guidance.4  
In Part 1 of this paper, we set out why we consider that 
the legal framework in the EU (despite its best intentions) 
amplifies what are in reality relatively small differences in 
thinking around RPM. Primarily, this is because it asks 
economists, in the name of legal certainty, to draw a false 
dichotomy between agreements and practices which are harmful and 
those which are beneficial. For practices like naked price 
fixing, it is relatively easy for economists to agree on an 
answer. It is harder, however, for practices like RPM which can 
give rise to serious anticompetitive harm, but can also be 
indispensable for important and valuable efficiency benefits. 
This is discussed in Section 2, which provides a summary of the 
economic literature on RPM, and also emphasises the need for 
further empirical research in this area.  
Within the current legal framework, we conclude that there 
is not yet, in our view, sufficient evidence to justify moving 
                                                 
4 See European Commission  (2009) “Draft Commission Regulation on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical 
agreements and concerted practices”  available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_vertical_agreements
/draft_regulation_en.pdf , and  European Commission (2009) “Draft 
Commission Notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints” available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_vertical_agreements
/draft_regulation_en.pdf 
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RPM out of the EU's ‘presumed illegality’ or ‘object’ box and 
into a case by case assessment ‘effect’ box. However, it is 
clear that this will sometimes involve presuming illegality of 
RPM arrangements which in fact either do not restrict 
competition or, if they do, are nevertheless justified by their 
efficiency benefits. We would therefore have significant 
reservations about a legal framework which went beyond ‘presumed 
illegality’, for example making RPM 'de facto illegal' (because 
the presumption cannot in practice be rebutted), or 'per se 
illegal' as in the US pre-Leegin. 
 Based on this thinking, we set out in Section 3 a few small 
steps that might be taken towards a slightly more nuanced 
approach to assessing RPM, within a 'presumed illegality' 
framework, without sacrificing too much of the beneficial legal 
certainty that the current approach brings.  
First, we argue that it is important to ensure that any 
presumption of illegality is truly rebuttable, and we provide 
some thoughts as to how this might work. This includes the 
requirement that the authority should set out at least one 
plausible ‘theory of harm’ that is consistent with the known 
facts. 
Second, we suggest that a series of screens might usefully 
be adopted for considering whether there is likely to be a 
credible theory of harm in any particular case of RPM, and for 
3 
prioritising cases on this basis. We provide our initial 
thinking on what such a series of screens might look like, while 
recognising that there is room for further thinking in this 
area, and that further developments in the economic literature 
may be required before a definitive view can be taken on the 
appropriate screens. 
Third, while the use of screens for prioritisation of RPM 
cases may have an impact in the EU, we recognise that a 
prioritisation approach may not be effective in a system, such 
as the US, where much enforcement of competition law is via 
cases brought by private litigants. We therefore suggest that 
there may be some potential to use screens of this sort to help 
define a legal standard. Under this approach, if the screens are 
failed, this would be taken to demonstrate that there is no 
credible theory of harm associated with a particular case of 
RPM. In such circumstances, the presumption of illegality could 
be rebutted. Such an approach would have similarities to the 
sorts of screens that are commonly applied in the EU in Article 
82 abuse of dominance cases. 
These various steps require varying degrees of further 
work, with the third being the controversial and raising the 
most significant issues. However, we believe they all have 
potential to substantially ameliorate our current reservations, 
while preserving legal clarity and a position where RPM will, 
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for the most part, remain unlawful. Such steps would also have 
the benefit of avoiding cases – arguably such as Leegin – where 
there is no clear credible theory of harm, and which have the 
potential to bring the competition system into disrepute by 
making it appear out of touch with reality.  
1. LEGAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND: THE ROOT OF DISAGREEMENT 
 From an economic standpoint, competition law must be about 
ensuring competitive markets, which generate benefits for 
consumers, as well as driving productivity. As such, a key 
objective of any system of competition law should be to prevent 
firms from:  
• engaging in practices and signing agreements which 
appreciably prevent, restrict, or distort competition,  
• such that there is detriment to consumers that is not 
counter-balanced by efficiency benefits (which in turn can 
only be achieved through such practices or agreements).  
The wording of EC competition law on agreements (Article 1015) is 
in line with this economic thinking. The first of the above 
bullets corresponds precisely to Article 101(1) of the EC 
Treaty, which prevents agreements or concerted practices which 
“have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or 
                                                 
5 Previously Art 81 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
now Art 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union See 
Official Journal of the European Union, C 115/372, 9.5.2008. 
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distortion of competition within the common market”.6 The second 
bullet corresponds, more approximately, to Article 101(3) of the 
EC Treaty, which disapplies Article 101(1) where the agreement 
or practice in question “contributes to improving the production 
or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic 
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit, and which does not impose on the undertakings concerned 
restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of 
those objectives”.7
So far, so good. Difficulties arise, however, from the way 
in which the law is implemented in practice. On its face, the 
law seems to suggest the need to review every agreement or 
practice on a case by case basis, to assess whether there is an 
anticompetitive object or effect and, if so, to assess whether 
this is counter-balanced by efficiency benefits. In terms of 
practical application of the law, however, it is argued that 
there is a need for far greater legal certainty than this 
suggests.  
                                                 
6 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union - Part Three: Union Policies And Internal Actions - Title VII: 
Common Rules On Competition, Taxation And Approximation Of Laws - 
Chapter 1: Rules on competition - Section 1: Rules applying to 
undertakings - Article 101 (ex Article 81 TEC)  (2008/C 115/01) 
7 See Supranote 6. 
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There are two key reasons for this. Firstly, a case by case 
approach places a high burden on firms, who are not in position 
to carry out this sort of economic analysis for each and every 
one of their agreements, and there is a consequent risk that 
firms simply avoid engaging in particular agreements or 
practices, even where these would be beneficial. This would 
clearly be detrimental to both competition and economic 
efficiency. Secondly, and conversely, a case by case approach 
places a high burden on competition authorities and private 
plaintiffs in bringing antitrust actions, which could lead to 
too little enforcement and therefore insufficient deterrence of 
anticompetitive behaviour. Such concerns are especially 
significant for less mature regimes or smaller, less well 
resourced authorities. Again, this would be detrimental to a 
competitive economy. 
Creating legal certainty around the law on agreements 
For this reason, there have been moves - on both sides of 
the Atlantic - to put certain types of agreement and practice 
into particular ‘boxes’, removing the need for case by case 
analysis of the likely harmful effects of such practices.8 The 
                                                 
8 The European Court of Justice recently confirmed the principle that in 
"object cases" harmful effects can be presumed rather than needing to 
be proved, since practices in the object box are by their very nature 
regarded as harmful. [T-Mobile Netherlands BV and others v NMa, Case 
C-8/08, judgment of 4 June 2009.] It is worth noting that even in 
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following figure sets out some of the most common ‘boxes’ that 
have been used, along a spectrum which runs from ‘definitely 
illegal’ to ‘definitely legal’.  
Per se 
Illegality 
Presumed benefit 
(eg Block 
Exemptions) 
Effect 
Object Presumed lack  
of effect (eg  
De Minimis) 
Per se 
legality 
 
  
On the left hand side of the spectrum, ‘per se illegality’ 
is a box that is used in the US, but not the EU.9 An agreement 
which falls into this ‘per se illegality’ box is definitely 
unlawful. There is no potential for rebutting the presumption of 
anticompetitive harm, nor is there any potential for showing 
that the agreement has efficiency benefits that might counter-
balance any harm. Price-fixing is the classic ‘per se illegal’ 
agreement.10 The Leegin case was essentially about whether RPM, 
which had historically also been ‘per se illegal’ should be 
taken out of this box.11  
                                                                                                                                                             
object cases parties may adduce evidence to meet the exemption 
criteria under Article 101(3), though the burden of proof is on them 
to prove the criteria are satisfied [Matra Hachette v Commission, Case 
T-17/93 [1994] ECR II-595, para 85.] 
9 See Peeperkorn, L. “Resale Price Maintenance and its Alleged 
Efficiencies” (2008) 4 European Competition Journal 201, 212.  
10 Ibid. 
11 Leegin Creative Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, Supranote 3. 
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In the EU, the distinction is instead between ‘object’ and 
‘effect’ infringements. Practices that are anticompetitive by 
‘object’ are presumed anticompetitive.12 For these cases, a 
competition authority is not required to provide any real 
economic (or other) evidence of likely anticompetitive harm. It 
is sufficient to demonstrate that the practice fits into the 
'object' box and hence is illegal. However, the ‘object’ box 
differs from the US ‘per se illegality’ box in two ways – at 
least theoretically. Firstly, the presumption of anticompetitive 
harm is, while strong, nevertheless in theory rebuttable, if 
compelling evidence is adduced that the agreement could not have 
been expected to have an anticompetitive effect. Secondly, an 
object infringement can still, in theory, be exempted from 
Article 101(1) if it meets all of the conditions under Article 
101(3).13  
In reality, and as we will expand upon in the policy 
section, the extent to which the ‘object’ box differs from ‘per 
se illegality’ depends on the extent to which competition 
                                                 
12 See Commission notice of 13 October 2000: Guidelines on vertical 
restraints [COM(2000/C 291/01) - Official Journal C 291 of 
13.10.2000]. 
13 Specifically that the agreement creates efficiency benefits, that a 
fair share of these benefits pass to consumers, that the restrictions 
are indispensable and that there is no elimination of competition. See 
Supranote 6. 
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authorities and courts are open to accepting rebuttal arguments 
under 101(1) or efficiency arguments under 101(3). Should such 
arguments be dismissed without due consideration, then we 
believe that there would be little in practice to differentiate 
these US and EU approaches. 
At the other end of the spectrum, there is a variety of 
boxes under which an agreement or practice may be judged (likely 
to be) legal. Some practices are simply ‘per se legal’, on the 
basis of being viewed as unlikely to have an anticompetitive 
object or effect.14 Other agreements and practices are considered 
so unlikely to restrict competition appreciably that they are 
classed in a ‘presumed lack of effect’ box. The EU De Minimis 
doctrine is a good example of this.15 Likewise, for particular 
                                                 
14 So, for example, selective distribution is considered per se legal 
in the EU, so long as the criteria used for selecting distributors are 
purely qualitative and objective. 
15 The Commission’s “Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance” [OJ 
[1997] C 372/13, [1998] CMLR 192] sets out market share thresholds 
under which all agreements (other than those which fall in the object 
box) are presumed lawful. Again, this presumption can theoretically be 
rebutted. The current market share thresholds, which relate to the 
aggregate market shares held by all of the participating undertakings, 
are 5% for horizontal agreements and 10% for vertical agreements. 
Another good example is the Commission's guidance that buying groups 
are unlikely to be found unlawful if the parties to the agreement have 
a combined market share of below 15% on the purchasing market(s) as 
well as a combined market share of below 15% on the selling market(s) 
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types of agreement and particular market share thresholds, it 
can be presumed that, even if there is anticompetitive harm, 
this is counter-balanced by efficiency benefits’. The various EU 
Block Exemptions are good examples of these.16  
These various boxes clearly have the potential to provide a 
fair degree of legal certainty. The appropriate box, if any, for 
a particular agreement or practice will effectively depend on 
how likely it is the agreement or practice in question would be 
found illegal if a careful case-specific effects analysis were 
carried out. For example:  
• for practices such as naked price fixing, we would expect 
it to be fairly rare that case by case analysis would find 
the practice legal, and as such, it is appropriate to put 
such agreements into the ‘object’ (or even ‘per se 
illegality’) box; 
• for practices such as exclusive distribution by a firm 
without significant market power, or agreements between 
                                                                                                                                                             
(see the Commission's “Notice on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements” 
[OJ [2001] 2001/C3/02]. 
16 It is worth noting that Block Exemptions provide more legal 
certainty than a simple ‘rebuttable presumption’. If an agreement is 
covered by the criteria in a Block Exemption, then the benefit of the 
block exemption has to be explicitly removed before that agreement can 
be found unlawful, and firms are not liable for retrospective breach 
(that is, for their behaviour prior to the removal of the exemption). 
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firms with small market shares, where harm is either 
unlikely or is likely to be counter-balanced by efficiency 
benefits, the high likelihood that they would be found 
legal on a case by case analysis means that it is 
appropriate to place them in one of the boxes on the right 
hand side of the figure above.  
Agreements that don’t fall into any of these boxes continue to 
require a full ‘case by case’ ‘effects’ analysis. The EU does 
provide some further guidance, within its various guidelines, as 
to the circumstances under which it might expect to find 
particular agreements or practices lawful or unlawful.17 Beyond 
this, however, there has been relatively little work done on 
‘screens’ which might help firms and regulators in deciding - 
under an ‘effects’ analysis -  whether or not a particular 
agreement is lawful or unlawful.  
Comparison with Article 102 
It is interesting to contrast this situation with Article 
102 of the EC Treaty,18 the EU law relating to abuse of a 
dominant position. Under Article 102, practices are not 
                                                 
17 See Supranote 12  
18  Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union - Part Three: Union Policies And Internal Actions - 
Title Vii: Common Rules On Competition, Taxation And Approximation Of 
Laws - Chapter 1: Rules on competition - Section 1: Rules applying to 
undertakings - Article 102 (ex Article 82 TEC) 
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classified into ‘boxes’ in quite the same way as under Article 
101. There is no general doctrine that certain conduct is by its 
very nature regarded as being injurious to the proper 
functioning of normal competition.19 Indeed, it could be argued 
that all Article 102 practices are assessed on an 'effect' 
basis. However within this ‘effect’ category, the approach taken 
is fairly nuanced. The Courts and the Commission have, over 
time, established 'screens' which help them to determine both 
whether the practice can be presumed pro or anticompetitive, and 
what proof is needed to change this presumption.20 For example, 
firms have no duty to deal (that is, a refusal to supply a new 
customer is assumed not to be anticompetitive) unless there 
exist certain 'exceptional circumstances', specifically that the 
product is indispensable for competition, the refusal eliminates 
competition, and there is no clear objective justification.21
                                                 
19 There is no analog in Article 102 case law to the general concept of 
the ‘object box’ saying that likely harmful effects can be presumed in 
relation to certain types of conduct. It follows that the Commission/ 
NCAs must make an assessment of likely harmful effects as part of each 
Article 102 case.  
20 For example loyalty rebates granted in return for exclusive 
purchasing. [Michelin v Commission, Case C-62/86 [1991] ECR I-3359] Or 
predatory pricing where pricing below AVC is presumed to be abusive. 
[AKZO v Commission, Case T-203/01 [2003] ECR II-4071].  
21 It is worth noting that the Commission’s recent guidance on 
enforcement priorities under Article 102 provides additional screens – 
in particular price-cost based screens – which arguably go beyond 
13 
Another contrast with Article 102 is also worth bringing 
out. In theory, an agreement or practice which falls within the 
‘effect’ box under Article 81 is not presumed lawful or 
unlawful, absent a full effects analysis. Nevertheless it is our 
opinion, based on our experience of working at an enforcing 
agency, that practices or agreements which fall into the 
‘effect’ box are often viewed as ‘more or less’ legal. Or at the 
very least, there seems to be an expectation that firms will 
consider that the competition authority or private plaintiff 
will face an uphill struggle in proving, on a full effects 
analysis basis, why an agreement or practice is likely to be 
anticompetitive and should therefore be found illegal. If so, we 
should not be surprised to observe firms deciding to wear the 
litigation risk and engage in the behaviour.22  
                                                                                                                                                             
(although are consistent with) current case precedent. However, these 
are (theoretically) intended to set enforcement priorities rather than 
legal standards. See European Commission,  "Guidance on the 
Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings", 
[C(2009) 864]. 
22 In reality, the extent to which this last point concern is valid is 
linked to the standard of proof required by Courts in order to show 
anticompetitive effect. If this standard of proof is set too high, 
then it will be more rational for firms to engage in anticompetitive 
behaviour, since the risk of effective litigation is low. This 
suggests less difference between the ‘effect’ box and ‘per se 
legality’ than might have been expected. Such a situation arguably in 
14 
Under Article 102, by contrast, there is certainly no 
presumption that all behaviour of dominant firms is ‘more or 
less’ lawful, absent an examination of the ‘screens’. This 
perception has been reinforced by the extremely high fines which 
the Commission has imposed in abuse cases in recent years.23
Implications for RPM 
Let us now turn (belatedly) to RPM. Based on the above, the 
key question from a legal perspective is whether it is 
appropriate to put RPM in one or other of the above boxes. To 
assess this, the core question would seem to be as follows: how 
often would RPM, if assessed on a case by case basis, be found 
to be illegal (that is, found to be anticompetitive and without 
countervailing efficiency benefits)? If the answer is ‘usually’ 
or ‘very often’, then the approach described above suggests that 
RPM should be put into the ‘object’ box. 
The only problem with this ‘core’ question is that 
economists dread being asked it, because they find it 
exceptionally hard to answer. The difficulty is that, as will be 
                                                                                                                                                             
turn increases the pressure to put into the ‘object’ box agreements 
and practices which are fairly (but maybe not very) likely to be 
harmful. 
23 See for example the fine of EUR 497,196,304 imposed by the EU 
Commission on Microsoft Corporation (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft), 
or the fine of EUR 1.06 billion to Intel (Case COMP/C-3 /37.990 - 
Intel). 
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discussed below, from an economic perspective RPM sits rather 
awkwardly on the spectrum in the figure above.  Yes, for sure, it 
can be anticompetitive. But it can also give rise to important 
efficiency benefits, and in some cases will be indispensable for 
achieving those efficiency benefits. Many economists would agree 
that RPM is, if anything, slightly closer to the left hand side 
of the above figure than the right hand side.24  But we believe 
that most economists would agree that its precise position in 
any given case will depend on market circumstances, and 
certainly that it is not squarely on the left hand side, holding 
hands with naked price fixing or dancing around with bid 
rigging. 
Faced with having to choose whether RPM is mostly harmful 
or mostly beneficial, some economists (such as us) will veer 
towards the left hand side of the spectrum, and plump for RPM 
being an ‘object’ infringement. Others cannot stomach the fact 
that this approach has the implication of presuming unlawful, on 
the one hand, agreements that could not possibly have an 
anticompetitive effect and, on the other hand, agreements that 
                                                 
24  See  for example “Rey, P., and T. Vergé, “Economics of Vertical 
Restraints,” in P. Buccirossi, ed., Handbook of Antitrust Economics, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008, pp. 353–391. And also G. Shaffer, 
“Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of 
Facilitating Practices” (1991) 22 Rand Journal of Economics 120,136. 
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have real efficiency benefits. These economists plump for RPM 
being an ‘effect’ infringement.  
What is interesting is that there is not necessarily a 
great deal of difference between the views of these two sets of 
economists. Rather, they are making different choices from what 
seems - from an economic perspective - an unappetising menu of 
options. Relatively small differences in view are therefore by 
the legal framework with which economists are presented. 
 
2. INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMICS OF RPM 
 This section of this paper looks further at the economics 
of RPM, and why economists find the choice described above so 
difficult. 
Efficiency benefits of RPM 
 There is a wide and still-growing literature on RPM, but 
the literature on the efficiency benefits of RPM is, for the 
most part, older and better-established than that on its 
anticompetitive effects.25 Essentially there are three broad 
economic arguments for allowing RPM.  
                                                 
25 See for example Peeperkorn, L. (2008), “Resale Price Maintenance and 
its Alleged Efficiencies European Competition Journal, Vol. 4,.pp. 
201-12. Or Stallibrass, D. and E. Giovannetti (2009), “Three Cases in 
search of a Theory: Resale Price Maintenance in the UK”, European 
Competition Journal (VOL. 5 NO. 3 641-654). 
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The first, which formed the basis of the DoJ and FTC's 
submissions in the Leegin case, is that while RPM reduces intra-
brand price competition, it can promote inter-brand competition. 
It can do this by providing quality certification26, or by 
reducing free riding at the distribution level on aspects such 
as service provision.27  
The idea here is straightforward. Where retailers carry out 
some form of service on behalf of manufacturers, but where this 
service involves the retailers incurring a cost, there is a risk 
– absent RPM - that retailers that do not provide the service 
could cut prices and win business away from retailers that do. A 
typical concern might be a customer spending time in the testing 
room of a posh hi-fi shop, comparing a variety of speakers, and 
then going and buying the chosen speakers elsewhere from the 
cheapest outlet. If this occurs, then clearly the incentives of 
retailers to provide these services will be reduced, which will 
be bad for the manufacturer and also for consumers.28  
                                                 
26 As suggested in Marvel, H. P. and S. McCafferty (1984) “Resale Price 
Maintenance and Quality Certification.” Rand Journal of Economics, 15. 
pp. 346-359. 
27 This argument was first elaborated in Telser, L.G. (1960).”Why 
should manufacturers want fair trade?” Journal of Law and Economics, 
3. 86-105. 
28 The quality certification literature is essentially the same, but 
the ‘service’ which the retailer provides is a form of ‘quality 
18 
 The second argument relates to the ‘indispensability’ 
question which is asked when assessing efficiency benefits under 
101(3).29 While other vertical restraints can achieve some of the 
same benefits as RPM, there will be circumstances (for example 
the presence of risk aversion) in which RPM is more effective 
than these other restraints.  
An intuitive example might be a supplier of a branded 
product, who primarily sells through a specialist bricks and 
mortar retail network and is keen to protect this network since 
it is its primary route to market, but who has been approached 
by an internet retailer. The supplier is concerned that if he 
supplies the internet retailer, absent RPM, then the internet 
retailer could price low and damage the viability of his bricks 
and mortar network. Two possible options open to him are to 
refuse to supply the internet retailer, through not including 
                                                                                                                                                             
certification’ service. By stocking a given product the retailer 
implicitly guarantees the quality of that product in the eyes of 
consumers. An example might be a smart department store stocking a 
particular perfume and thereby raising the brand profile of that 
perfume. There is a cost involved in being a smart department store, 
so if all customers just go and buy the perfume more cheaply 
elsewhere, the department store will not be able to survive. This will 
in turn not only remove a valued outlet for customers but also an 
important quality certification mechanism for suppliers. (In practice, 
the department store is more likely simply to refuse to stock any 
perfume for which this is likely to happen). 
29 See Supranote 6 
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him within his (legal) selective distribution system, or to 
agree to supply him but on an RPM basis. If, as here, the 
counterfactual to RPM is not to supply at all, then RPM may in 
fact be the more efficient and procompetitive option. 
The third argument is based on the standard Chicago school 
argument that, in any given market, there is only one monopoly 
profit.30 An upstream monopolist has no ability to increase its 
profits through RPM, since it should in any case be able to 
extract the full monopoly market rent through its wholesale 
pricing structure (at least so long as non-linear pricing is 
possible). As such, the argument runs, RPM cannot be welfare-
reducing and, if it is undertaken, should be assumed 
beneficial.31
Anticompetitive effects of RPM 
Whilst the literature setting out procompetitive rationales 
of RPM has existed for some time, the anticompetitive literature 
is relatively more recent and still developing. In the 
following, we have (we hope without doing too much injury to the 
                                                 
30 See Posner R.A. (1976), Antitrust Law an Economic Perspective. 
University of Chicago Press. Chicago, USA. 
31 It should be highlighted that the elimination of double 
marginalisation is not a good argument for the imposition of RPM, 
since it is in fact solved by maximum RPM, which is typically legal. 
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subtleties of each individual paper) classified the literature 
under five types of effect.32
The first relates to RPM as a facilitating practice to 
sustain upstream collusion. This theory relates to inter-brand 
competition. When upstream firms wish to collude, but negotiate 
contracts with wholesalers or retailers in private, it can be 
hard for any collusive agreement to be monitored; rival 
wholesale prices cannot be monitored and enforced, and retail 
prices are an imperfect proxy for them. Jullien and Rey (2007) 
have shown that in this context upstream firms can use RPM as a 
facilitating practice for collusion since it brings the publicly 
observable element of price under their control.33  
The second relates to RPM as a facilitating practice to 
sustain downstream collusion. This can occur where downstream 
firms wish to engage in collusion. They can use the imposition 
of multiple RPM agreements by an upstream firm (acting as a 
'common agent') to facilitate downstream price collusion. The 
enforcement of RPM can facilitate agreement on prices, 
monitoring of prices, and even punishment for cheating on the 
collusive agreement. In some instances, the RPM is effectively 
                                                 
32 Each of these effects is robust to the Chicago critique described 
above. 
33 Jullien, B. and P. Rey (2007) “Resale Price Maintenance and 
collusion” Rand Journal of Economics, 38-4, pp. 983-1001. 
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no more than a 'sham' vertical agreement, masking a pure 
horizontal agreement.34  
The third relates to the use of RPM as a commitment device 
to protect upstream monopoly rents. This relates to a now well 
known monopoly commitment problem, originally identified in Hart 
and Tirole (1990).35 A monopolist maximises its profit by selling 
the right to distribute to only one downstream player. However 
                                                 
34  In the UK, the practice of retailers coordinating their behaviour 
via an upstream supplier has become known as “A to B to C” 
coordination.  
In Argos Ltd & Anor v Office of Fair Trading [2006] EWCA Civ 1318, the 
Court of Appeal held (at paragraph 141) that ‘… if (i) retailer A 
discloses to supplier B its future pricing intentions in circumstances 
where A may be taken to intend that B will make use of that 
information to influence market conditions by passing that information 
to other retailers (of whom C is or may be one), (ii) B does, in fact, 
pass that information to C in circumstances where C may be taken to 
know the circumstances in which the information was disclosed by A to 
B and (iii) C does, in fact, use the information in determining its 
own future pricing intentions, then A, B and C are all to be regarded 
as parties to a concerted practice having as its object the 
restriction or distortion of competition ... The case is all the 
stronger where there is reciprocity: in the sense that C discloses to 
supplier B its future pricing intentions in circumstances where C may 
be taken to intend that B will make use of that information to 
influence market conditions by passing that information to (amongst 
others) A, and B does so.’ 
35 Hart, O. and J. Tirole (1990). "Vertical Integration and Market 
Foreclosure", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 
0, pp. 205-276. 
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ex post it has an incentive to break this agreement and sell to 
additional downstream players. The overall effect is that, 
absent a commitment device, the upstream firm is unable to 
extract the full rent associated with its market power, because 
it cannot commit itself to not cutting prices on later 
contracts. RPM solve this problem, by allowing the upstream firm 
to commit to the monopoly price and extract its full monopoly 
rents. This has also been shown under different conditions by 
O’Brien and Shaffer (1992) and Rey and Vergé (2004a).36
The fourth relates to the use of RPM as a means either to 
soften downstream competition or deter downstream entry. Shaffer 
(1991) has shown that downstream firms may have a unilateral 
incentive to ask the upstream firm to implement RPM as a means 
to soften competition between themselves.37 More generally RPM 
can benefit downstream firms by making it harder for cut-price 
entrants to steal business through undercutting them. Such 
                                                 
36 Hart and Tirole (1990) discuss commitment problems in a Cournot 
setting. Similar results were then derived for a differentiated 
product market in O’Brien, D. and G. Shaffer (1992), “Vertical Control 
with Bilateral Contracts”, Rand Journal of Economics, 23.pp. 299-308 
and generalised in Rey, P. and T. Verge’ (2004). “Bilateral Control 
with Vertical Contracts”, Rand Journal of Economics, 35. pp. 728-46.. 
Note that price ceilings can also solve this commitment problem. 
37 See Shaffer, G., (1991) “Slotting Allowances and Resale Price 
Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practices” Rand Journal of 
Economics, 22. 120-136. 
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entrants can still make additional profits through greater 
efficiencies, but they cannot use these efficiencies to steal 
business through lower prices.38  
The final theory relates to the use of RPM as a means to 
dampen system competition through networks of interlocking RPM 
agreements. The simplest example would be a market where there 
is a duopoly of manufacturers upstream and a duopoly of 
retailers downstream and both retailers carry the products of 
both manufacturers, a situation defined as “double common 
agency”. Dobson and Waterson (2007) have shown that in a 
bargaining framework, RPM can reduce retailers’ incentives to 
negotiate on wholesale prices by preventing downstream 
undercutting.39 This, in turn, dampens upstream competition and 
creates higher retail prices, to the detriment of consumers.40 
More generally Rey and Vergé (2004b) have shown that RPM can 
potentially eliminate all effective competition — at the inter-
brand level as well as at the intra-brand level — and yield 
                                                 
38 See OFT (2007) "An evaluation of the impact upon productivity of 
ending resale price maintenance on books" and Davies et al (2004). 
39 Dobson, P.W. and M. Waterson (2007) “The Competition Effects of 
Industry-Wide Vertical Price Fixing in Bilateral Oligopoly” 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 25, pp. 935-962. 
40 Essential to Dobson and Waterson is the bargaining process, whereby 
wholesale prices depend on the distribution of bargaining power 
between manufacturers and retailers. See Supranote 39 
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instead the monopoly outcome, if used jointly with franchise 
fees.41
 
The dreaded question: How often is RPM likely to be on balance 
harmful?  
Given that there is the potential for both anticompetitive 
harm from RPM and also for efficiency benefits, which of these 
is most likely to be dominant? Or putting it another way how 
likely are these theories of harm, and how significant are the 
efficiencies likely to be?  
It is worth noting that there is not a particularly strong 
empirical literature regarding RPM. Lafontaine and Slade (2008) 
provide the most recent summary of the existing empirical 
evidence on RPM.42 Within a broader analysis of vertical 
restraints they identify three empirical research papers looking 
                                                 
41 Rey, P. and T. Verge’ (2004b) “Resale Price Maintenance and 
Horizontal Cartel” Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK, 
Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation. 
42 See Lafontaine, F. and M. Slade (2008) Exclusive Contracts and 
Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence and Public Policy. In Paolo 
Buccirossi (ed.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics, Cambridge: MIT 
Press. See also Ippolito and Overstreet (1996) "Resale Price 
Maintenance: an economic assessment of the Federal Trade Commission's 
case against the corning glass works", Journal of Law and Economics, 
Vol. XXXIX and Cooper, Froeb, O'Brien and Vita (2005), "Vertical 
antitrust policy as a problem of inference International", Journal of 
Industrial Organization. 
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at RPM.43 One of these papers examined cases where RPM was 
imposed by government,44 whilst two of them examined cases in 
which RPM was imposed by firms.45 Lafontaine and Slade conclude 
that self imposed RPM cases have an overall positive impact 
while the exogenously imposed ones have a negative impact.46 
However the authors themselves caution against drawing strong 
policy conclusions given the quantity and quality of the 
empirical work has still a ways to go.47
Looking at actual cases can potentially give a misleading 
impression too, since these cases are self-selected by the 
competition authorities. That said, the OFT has intervened 
against RPM on a number of occasions, and in each case the 
evidence supported the view that the RPM in question was 
anticompetitive and not outweighed by efficiency benefits. For 
                                                 
43 These are  Ippolito, P. M. and Overstreet, T.R., Jr, (1996) “Resale 
Price Maintenance: An Economic Assessment of the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Case against the Corning Glass Works,” Journal of Law and 
Economics, 39: 285–328; Gilligan, T.W. (1986) “The Competitive Effects 
of Resale Price maintenance,” RAND Journal of Economics, 17: 544–556; 
Ornstein, S.I. and Hanssens, D. (1987) “Resale Price Maintenance: 
Output Increasing or Restricting? The Case of Distilled Spirits in the 
US,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 36: 401–432. . 
44 Ornstein, S.I. and Hanssens, D. (1987). Supranote 47. 
45 Ippolito, P. M. and Overstreet, T.R., Jr, (1996) and Gilligan, T.W. 
(1986). Supranote 47.. 
46 Supranote 42 
47 Supranote 42 
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example, two recent OFT infringement decisions had theories of 
coordination closely interlinked with them, albeit not always 
explicitly stated within the decision.48  
On the benefit side, the OFT commissioned research on the 
impact of the removal of RPM in books, which took the form of 
the “Net Book Agreement”.49 This agreement was in place from 1901 
until 1997, and allowed publishers to set the retail prices of 
books.50 In 1962, when the agreement was given legal sanction 
under the Restrictive Practices Act, many efficiency arguments 
were made as to how removal of this longstanding agreement would 
damage the market for books.51 The Agreement was disbanded in 
                                                 
48 In the OFT’s case on children’s toys (OFT, 2003), the RPM was 
closely associated with exchanges of information between two large 
downstream retailers, which is consistent with RPM being used as a 
facilitating device to sustain downstream collusion. In the case on 
replica football kit (OFT, 2003) the RPM practice and market 
circumstances were consistent with facilitating collusion upstream or 
downstream. For more details on our analysis of these cases, see 
Stallibrass and Giovannetti (2009) in Supranote 25.  
49  See OFT (2007) "OFT 981 An evaluation of the impact upon 
productivity of ending resale price maintenance on books". Report 
prepared for the OFT by the Centre for Competition Policy at 
University of East Anglia. 
50 See Davies, S W, Coles, H, Olczak, M, Pike, C, and Wilson, C, 
(2004), 'The benefits from competition: some illustrative UK cases', 
DTI Economics Paper No. 9. 
51 See Davies et al, supranote50, page 32: “In 1962 the Restrictive 
Practices Court considered the illegality of the NBA, and contrary to 
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1995, following pressure from the competition authorities.52 In 
practice, and contrary to expectations, the research found that 
total sales volumes for books increased, as did the number of 
titles published.53 There was also a significant increase in 
retail diversity, with the growth of new retail formats 
facilitated by their ability to offer discounted books.54 The UK 
situation also compared very positively with the situation in 
Germany where RPM had been maintained.55  
On balance, it is far from obvious which way the scales tip 
on RPM. As the academic literature acknowledges, the body of 
research is simply not large enough to suggest strong 
conclusions either way. More empirical evidence would be 
invaluable.56 However, on the basis of the evidence available to 
date, if we have to make a binary choice between ‘object’ and 
‘effect’, we believe that there is simply not enough evidence to 
conclude that RPM should be moved from the ‘object’ category 
                                                                                                                                                             
initial intuition, its judgement exempted the NBA, allowing it to 
continue. In the judgement, Mr. Justice Buckley famously emphasised 
that ‘Books are different’, and considered the NBA to be in society’s 
interest.” . 
52 See Davies et al, supranote 50, paragraph 2.3. 
53 Supranote 49 
54 Supranote 49 
55 Supranote 49 
56 This is one of the main conclusions of Lafontaine, F. and M. Slade 
(2008) in Supranote 42 
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into the ‘effect’ box. Two main factors tip us towards this 
view.  
First is the role of RPM in facilitating coordination, a 
role which other vertical restraints do not seem to have. We 
believe this is not just a minor theoretical point, as is 
illustrated by the recent OFT infringement cases described 
above.  
Second is the fact that many of the benefits that RPM 
provides may also, at least in theory, be secured by other 
vertical restraints. Whilst there are some cases (for example 
risk aversion) in which RPM may be better suited to securing 
efficiencies than other types of restraints, it is unclear how 
frequently these occur in practice. 
 
3. SMALL STEPS TOWARDS A MORE NUANCED POLICY? 
As discussed above, given the legal framework described in 
Section 1, we on balance support the retention of RPM within the 
‘object’ box. However, the preceding discussion shows that we 
have some reservations about a legal framework which, in the 
name of legal certainty, forces into a ‘presumed illegality’ box 
some agreements and practices which either do not restrict 
competition or, if they do, would nevertheless be justified by 
the efficiency benefits they bring. This issue is particularly 
relevant to the case of RPM.  
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In this final section, we set out our thoughts on a few 
small steps that might be taken towards a slightly more nuanced 
approach to assessing RPM. These would substantially ameliorate 
our current reservations, while preserving a position where RPM 
will, for the most part, remain unlawful. 
(i) Ensuring that the presumption of illegality is truly 
rebuttable 
The first step that we would propose towards a more nuanced 
approach should be relatively straightforward and uncontentious. 
This would be to widen the gap between the EU ‘object’ box and 
the US ‘per se illegality’ box. Under the former, there is 
potential for parties to rebut a presumption of illegality, and 
we believe that the potential for rebuttal should be given more 
serious consideration; whether this be on the grounds of there 
being no restriction of competition (that is, no infringement 
under Article 101(1)) or of countervailing benefits (that is, 
exemptibility under Article 101(3)).57
In order to facilitate rebuttal where appropriate, we would 
also argue that the authority should set out one or more 
                                                 
57 In this light, we are pleased to note that there have been several 
changes made in the draft revised block exemption guidelines to stress 
the importance of efficiency arguments in the context of Article 
101(3) See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union See 
Official Journal of the European Union, C 115/372, 9.5.2008, Supranote 
12.  
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‘theories of harm’. These would not need to be 'proven' – this 
change should not be seen as moving to the ‘effect’ box via the 
back door – but merely 'plausible'. That is, they would need to 
be ‘consistent with’ the facts, including the market 
circumstances in which the RPM had been applied.58
(ii) The use of screens for prioritising RPM cases 
The second step we propose is that a series of screens 
might usefully be adopted for considering whether there is 
likely to be a credible theory of harm in any particular case of 
RPM, and for prioritising cases on this basis.  
Returning to our review of the existing economic literature 
in this area, we have attempted to identify three relatively 
simple screens, at least one of which would need to hold in 
order for there to be the possibility of a credible theory of 
harm associated with the RPM.  
• First, is there unilateral market power or concentration 
upstream? If not there is unlikely to be a theory of harm 
                                                 
58 In order to preserve legal certainty, we would propose that the 
hurdle for rebuttal be fairly high. For example, it would not be 
enough for a party to state that “the authority has not proven that 
this instance of RPM was likely to have a harmful effect”. Rather the 
burden would be on the party to demonstrate that “this instance of RPM 
could not possibly have been expected to have a harmful effect, as 
evidenced by the fact that the authority cannot come up with a theory 
of harm which is consistent with the known facts”.  
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regarding protecting upstream market power. Nor is there 
likely to be a strong theory of facilitating upstream 
coordination if the upstream market is fragmented.  
• Second, is there significant downstream buyer power or 
concentration? If not, there is unlikely to be a strong 
theory of harm regarding RPM facilitating downstream 
coordination or deliberately foreclosing downstream entry. 
We note that this screen could be further strengthened by 
evidence that the RPM is manufacturer instigated rather 
than retailer. 
• Third, are there networks of RPM agreements involving a 
number of upstream suppliers who account for a significant 
share of the upstream market? If not there is unlikely to 
be a theory of harm regarding RPM facilitating upstream 
market coordination 
If none of these three elements hold in a particular case, there 
is unlikely to be a credible theory of harm, and therefore the 
case would not be prioritised.  
We recognise that there is room for further thinking in 
this area. (For example, how exactly does one define 
concentration?) Indeed, further developments in the economic 
literature may be required before a definitive view can be taken 
on the appropriate screens. Nevertheless, we see real potential 
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for such screens being used by authorities for case 
prioritisation purposes. 
(iii) The use of screens within a legal standard 
The final step considered in this section is perhaps more 
controversial, but we think it is nevertheless worthy of further 
discussion.  
While the use of screens for prioritisation of RPM cases 
may have an impact in the EU, we recognise that a prioritisation 
approach may not be effective in a system, such as the US, where 
much enforcement of competition law is via cases brought by 
private litigants. However, there may also be some potential to 
use screens of this sort to help define a legal standard. Under 
this approach, the authority (or plaintiff) would have to 
satisfy itself that at least one of the screens was satisfied 
before taking a case. If all screens were failed, this would be 
taken to demonstrate that there is no credible theory of harm 
associated with a particular case of RPM, and in such 
circumstances, the presumption of illegality would be overturned 
and the RPM would be viewed as legal.  
We believe that this approach would nevertheless leave most 
potential cases of RPM in the ‘illegal’ box, and would preserve 
legal clarity, but that it would avoid cases – such as 
(arguably) Leegin – where there is no clear credible theory of 
harm, and which have the potential to bring the competition 
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system into disrepute by making it appear out of touch with 
reality.  
There are, however, some noteworthy cons to this approach. 
Some would no doubt argue that, by blurring the lines of what is 
an ‘object’ infringement, firms become less able to self-assess, 
smaller retailers find it more difficult to stand up to powerful 
suppliers who try to impose RPM, authorities become less able to 
bring cases, and we start to move inappropriately towards a 
standard ‘effects’ analysis. For us, however, a more compelling 
concern is that the screens not only relate to the practices and 
position of the parties involved in a particular RPM agreement, 
but also the concentration in the relevant market and whether 
there is a network of similar RPM agreements across the market. 
If this approach means that a firm cannot assess the legality of 
its own RPM without knowing (possibly secret) information about 
its competitors, then it may be that they prove unworkable.  
Nevertheless, we think this approach is worthy of further 
consideration. It is also worth noting that such an approach 
would have similarities to the sorts of screens that are 
commonly applied in the EU when assessing abuse of dominance 
cases under Article 102 of the EC Treaty.59
 
                                                 
59 Supranote 18. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Within the current legal framework there is, in our view, 
not yet sufficient evidence available to justify moving RPM out 
of the ‘presumed illegality’ or ‘object’ box and into a case by 
case assessment ‘effect’ box. However, from the above 
discussion, it is clear that RPM falls a long way short of more 
extreme anticompetitive behaviour such as naked horizontal price 
fixing.  
In an ideal world, the law would reflect this difference, 
and in the final section of this paper we set out some small 
steps towards a slightly more nuanced approach to assessing RPM. 
While further work is required before these could be fully 
implemented, we believe that these few small changes could 
greatly ameliorate our reservations about the current legal 
framework, while preserving a position where RPM will, for the 
most part, remain unlawful. 
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